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Since 2002 the German government seeks to stimulate private retirement savings by means of 
special allowances and tax exemptions – the so-called Riester scheme. We apply matching 
and panel regression techniques to assess the impact of the Riester scheme on households’ 
propensities to save in a natural experiment framework. Estimation results from both the 
German Socio-Economic Panel and the SAVE study indicate that private saving was hardly 
affected by the introduction of the Riester scheme.  
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A major ingredient of governmental responses to demographic changes eroding the financial 
basis of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension systems has been to favor household saving for 
retirement purposes. Currently, certified financial instruments for retirement saving are 
promoted by means of tax deductions and subsidies in several countries.1 A crucial issue 
about such government-sponsored retirement plans is whether households finance their 
contributions with genuinely new saving – that would not have been done in the absence of 
those incentives - or with reductions in other assets, including increased borrowing. While 
new savings add to national wealth and raise future national income, a mere reallocation of 
financial assets has, if any, ambiguous effects on future national income. Hence, the 
evaluation of tax-favored retirement plans hinges upon their impact on households’ saving 
behavior. Since 2002 also the German government supports private retirement saving plans by 
means of a saving incentive program called the Riester scheme. Meanwhile, generous 
incentives and pessimistic expectations about future pension benefits from the PAYG system 
have led a substantial fraction of the German population in working age to participate in the 
Riester scheme. This paper presents estimates of the effect of the Riester scheme on the 
saving propensities of German households. 
The extent to which tax incentives and subsidies raise private saving is still an 
unresolved issue. For the eligible households, standard theory does not offer an unambiguous 
prediction because of countervailing income and substitution effects from a higher net return 
on saving. Further insights are offered by behavioral economics. Subsidized private pension 
schemes may increase households’ savings if those schemes include penalties from early 
withdrawals that act as a valuable self-control device for savers. However, behavioral 
approaches may also predict that subsidized schemes reduce private saving. To the extent that 
households follow the rule of saving enough to replace a fixed percentage of their income in 
retirement, a higher net return on saving reduces the amount of saving necessary for that 
replacement. Furthermore, the savings of households not eligible for the subsidy may be 
affected. If the subsidy is financed by increased taxes on non-eligible households or by 
reducing the transfers that they receive, the saving by non-eligible households is likely to 
diminish.    
Previous empirical research on the effectiveness of saving incentives has dealt 
overwhelmingly with the US experience (Antolín et al., 2004, Annex 2). In the United States, 
401(k) has become the main vehicle for retirement saving and much attention has been 
                                                            
1 See Antolín et al. (2004) and Yoo and de Serres (2004) for overviews. 
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devoted to evaluate its effectiveness. Early influential papers by Engen et al. (1994) and 
Poterba et al. (1995) presented results from median regressions and reached quite 
contradictory conclusions about the substitution between 401(k) assets and other type of 
savings. Recent papers, employing more sophisticated estimation techniques, have tended to 
find much heterogeneity in households’ responses to 401(k)s and substantial crowding-out 
effects in the case of high-income households (Benjamin, 2003; Chernozhukov and Hansen, 
2004).2 For Germany, Corneo et al. (2009) have evaluated the Riester scheme as a natural 
experiment which affects the saving propensity of a treatment group relative to a control 
group. Their findings cast some doubts on the effectiveness of the Riester scheme in terms of 
mobilization of new savings.3 
The current paper substantially extends the work presented in Corneo et al. (2009) 
along four main dimensions. First, we consider a broader set of treatment and control groups. 
In particular, we compare changes in the saving propensities of households eligible for Riester 
subsidies with the changes in saving propensities of non-eligible households, changes in the 
savings of households who benefit from high subsidies relative to those who receive low 
subsidies, and changes in the savings of eligible households having a Riester contract and 
those who do not. Second, we exploit statistical matching and panel regression techniques to 
address important issues of self-selection and unobserved heterogeneity. Third, in addition to 
the German Socio-Economic Panel we use the SAVE dataset, which has been explicitly 
designed to investigate the saving behavior of private households in Germany. Fourth, we 
provide not only an evaluation in a pre- vs. post-reform perspective but also an assessment of 
the impact of the so-called Riester steps, namely the stepwise increase in subsidies and 
required saving amounts over time.  
In order to check the robustness of our empirical findings, we combine the two 
datasets mentioned above with three estimation methods. First, we use random-effects tobit 
panel models to regress saving rates before and after the reform on a dummy distinguishing 
treated and non-treated subjects, a post-reform dummy, an interaction of the two dummies, 
and a set of socio-economic characteristics. Size and sign of the interaction terms serve as 
indicators of a stimulating effect of the Riester scheme in the various approaches. Second, we 
take first differences of the savings ratio and other explanatory variables and run OLS 
regressions in first differences. Thereby, treatments effects are identified by sign and size of 
                                                            
2 See also Duflo et al. (2007) who have evaluated the “saver’s credit”, a US federal program to encourage 
retirement savings, finding modest effects. 
3 Börsch-Supan et al. (2008b) and Pfarr and Schneider (2009) have investigated the determinants of participation 




the treatment coefficient. Third, we provide estimates for a subsample where treated and 
control subjects share the same socio-economic and demographic characteristics. We identify 
such statistical twins using a matching algorithm recently proposed by Iacus et al. (2008). 
Their algorithm ensures that treated and control units are approximately balanced on the 
matching variables. With the matched observations at hand, it is then possible to infer the 
average treatment effect on the treated.  
We find insignificant treatment effects from the Riester scheme in almost all 
regressions, and the average treatment effects obtained from the matched datasets confirm the 
regression results. Our main conclusion is that in Germany household saving hardly 
responded to the introduction of that saving incentive program. Participation in the Riester 
scheme seems to largely substitute for other forms of saving. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
functioning of the Riester scheme. Our databases, the German Socio Economic Panel and the 
SAVE study, are presented in Section 3. The econometric modeling is described in Section 4. 
Section 5 presents our results, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2 The Riester scheme 
The Riester scheme started operating in 2002. Beneficiaries receive allowances (a basic 
allowance and child allowances), and can lower their income tax liability by means of 
deductions. A minimum saving effort is requested from the beneficiaries. More precisely, the 
allowance and the personal saving effort must add up to a specific amount, which is 
proportional to the individual’s income subject to social insurance contributions. The 
minimum saving amount is defined as a share of the income subject to social insurance 
contribution of the previous year, including the allowances. This share increased stepwise 
from one percent in the first year to four percent in 2008. These so-called Riester-steps are 
displayed in Figure 1. Also the level of allowances and the maximal amount of tax deductions 
have been increased stepwise since the introduction of the Riester scheme.4 If the Riester 
scheme stimulated private savings, its mobilization effect should be visible in a pre- and post-
reform comparison as well as along the Riester steps: the higher the required minimum 
savings amount and the subsidies granted, the higher the household savings.  
 
Figure 1 about here 
                                                            
4 Schulze and Jochem (2007) provide a detailed introduction to the German pension system and its recent 
reforms, including the Riester scheme. The political economy of the Riester reform has recently been analyzed 




A large portion of the active population in Germany is eligible for Riester subsidies, estimates 
going from 30 to 36 million people. Basically, all compulsorily insured persons in the German 
public pension system are eligible for Riester contracts. In addition, public servants, trainees, 
individuals in the mandatory military or social service, and the recipients of some types of 
public transfers (e.g., unemployment benefits) may participate. Persons who are not statutorily 
insured in the mandatory public pension system are usually not eligible; those persons include 
several groups of self employees, marginal employees and students, social welfare recipients, 
senior citizens receiving a pension, and persons receiving disability benefits.5  
The impact of the Riester scheme on national (private plus public) saving also depends 
on its effect on the public debt. An exact calculation of the fiscal burden from the Riester 
scheme can only be performed with some delay because the deadline of application for a 
certain contribution year is two years later. Table 1 provides an overview of the current fiscal 
costs of the Riester scheme. The non-italic figures show the actual allowances and tax 
deductions. Assuming a constant relation between allowances and tax deductions as well as a 
proportional relation of Riester contracts on the one hand and both allowances6 and tax 
deductions on the other hand, our extrapolation (italic figures) yields annual direct costs of 2.8 
billion euros for 2008 and in the following years, depending on how the uptake of Riester 
contracts develops. In addition, indirect costs for certification, administration, etc. have to be 
accounted for. 
 




Our investigation is based on two data sources, the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 
and the SAVE study. The SOEP is a longitudinal study, located at the DIW Berlin (German 
Institute for Economic Research). Starting in 1984, it surveys meanwhile more than 20,000 
individuals in about 11,000 households every year.7 The SOEP contains information on 
household savings; in some years it also reports whether a surveyed household member owns 
a Riester contract or not. The exact wording of the survey question about saving reads as 
                                                            
5 However, eligibility regulations are very detailed and include a broad range of exemptions. See the publications 
by the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (2006) for further details.   
6 The child allowance is notably higher for children born in 2008 and later (Federal Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs, 2006). Therefore, child allowances as a share of overall costs may increase in the next years.  
7 For details, see e.g. Wagner et al. (2007) and the SOEP homepage at http://www.diw.de/en/soep. 
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follows: “Do you usually have an amount of money left over at the end of the month that you 
can save for larger purchases, emergency expenses or to acquire wealth? If yes, how much?” 
(see SOEP online documentation: http://www.diw.de/english/questionnaires/33919.html). 
Hence, it is not asked to report accidental savings but to state usual amounts intended for 
savings, including savings to acquire wealth for old age. 
The survey question reported above has extensively been used in econometric analyses 
of household saving decisions in Germany.8 Nevertheless, one cannot rule out that savings 
may be under-reported in the SOEP data as Corneo et al. (2009) find that some respondents 
that claim to have a Riester contract declare zero savings. Concerns about the quality of the 
saving variable in the SOEP database motivate our analysis of a second German panel 
database, the SAVE study. Similarly to the SOEP, the SAVE data include a one-shot savings 
measure (overall amount saved in the previous year) and information on Riester contracts.9 
We focus on the SOEP-based estimates because the number of households repeatedly 
participating in the SAVE study is substantially smaller as compared to the SOEP. In 
particular, sample sizes are not sufficient to ensure reliable matching results for the SAVE 
database. Hence, we only report regression estimates obtained from the sample before 
matching. Another limitation of SAVE is that in the year 2000 - the year before the Riester 
reform - that database was still in its experimental stage. Hence, SAVE-based before-after 
reform comparisons cannot be taken seriously. Only an assessment of the impact of the so-
called “Riester steps” on household savings is feasible; i.e., evaluations of the impact of the 
intertemporal rise in monetary incentives - higher allowances and tax deductions, but also 
higher required minimum savings efforts - on household savings.  
  
4 Treatment strategy 
We scrutinize the impact of the Riester scheme on households’ saving propensities by means 
of a treatment analysis. In order to assess the causal effect of the reform we compare pre- and 
post-reform propensities to save for two groups, a treatment group and a control group. Since 
people might have anticipated the Riester reform and correspondingly adjusted their pre-
reform savings, we use the year 2000 and not 2001 as the pre-reform period. To cope with the 
possibility that people adjusted their savings with some delay, various post-reform years are 
considered, from 2004 to 2007. The 2000-2004 comparison is our preferred one because 
                                                            
8 Among others, by Merkle and Zimmermann (1992) and Fuchs-Schündeln (2008). 
9 On the SAVE study see Börsch-Supan et al. (2008a). Essig (2005) discusses different savings measures and the 
reliability of the one-shot savings measure in the SAVE data. For further details, refer also to the SAVE 
questionnaires at the MEA homepage http://www.mea.uni-mannheim.de.  
7 
 
2005-2007 savings are likely to be affected by other factors as well, such as the introduction 
of so-called Rürup pensions in 2005.10  
Various definitions of the treatment and the control group are considered. The most 
straightforward procedure is to assign households to the treatment group if they are eligible 
for a Riester contract, and non-eligible households to the control group. A second possibility 
exploits the differentiation of the subsidy rate according to household income. The target 
group of low income households, which benefits from above average subsidy ratios, is then 
defined as the treatment group. A third option is based on the fact that Riester subsidies are 
higher for households with more children, potentially creating an extra incentive to save. In a 
fourth scenario, we have selected all households eligible for a Riester contract, and have 
classified them conditioning upon whether they have signed a contract or not. The 
characteristics of the treatment and the control group for all these four approaches are 
summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 about here  
 
When commenting upon our findings, we shall concentrate on the year combinations 2000-
2004 and 2000-2005 for the approaches 1-3 as well as 2000-2004, 2000-2006, and 2000-2007 
(since the uptake of Riester contracts was only surveyed in those years) for the Approach 4 
using the SOEP data. In addition, we shall discuss results based on observations from the 
SAVE study as surveyed in 2003 vs. 2005, 2006, and 2007. The relevant observation points 
are displayed in Figure 1.  
We proceed as follows: according to the characteristics displayed in Table 2, we 
assign a household to the various treatment and control groups. Then, we build subsamples 
for each year combination and keep only household observations that appear in both periods 
and that have the same treatment status in both years. Results from such an approach could be 
biased if excluded household observations have a different savings behavior compared to the 
considered household units. Then, the saving behavior of the considered households would 
not be representative for the entire population. For the approaches 1-3, we can rule out that 
household self-select into a different group between the two points of observation. In these 
approaches, treatment is linked to Riester eligibility (and, therefore, to employment and 
                                                            
10 Rürup pensions are subsidized private retirement saving contracts especially targeting people that are not 
mandatorily insured in the German pension scheme, e.g. the self-employed. Contributions are tax-deductible, 
and the accumulated capital is repaid as a monthly annuity. For details, see e.g. the homepage of the Federal 
Ministry of Finance at http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_39846/DE/BMF__Startseite/Service/ 
Glossar/R/004__Ruerup-Rente.html.   
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marital status) and the number of children. It seems very unlikely that fundamental household 
decisions such as occupation, marriage, or birth of children are driven by Riester-related 
considerations. Approach 4 is immune to such complications as only households enter the 
sample if all adult members are eligible, and treated households are characterized by the 
household head having a contract in the later period. Therefore, over time, no observation 
switches between the treated and the control group.  
Based on the aforementioned sample classifications, we evaluate the impact of the 
Riester scheme on household saving ratios, i.e., household savings divided by household net 
income. Since our dependent variable belongs to the unitary interval, and hence it is not 
normally distributed, and as our data exhibit a panel structure, we have chosen a random-
effects tobit model, building on the form 
 
( ) ( ) tiititititititi NRNRs ,,,,,,,1 ενδχμβα +++⋅+++= x .  
 
In Eq. (1), i  identifies a specific household, t  denotes the observation period, iν  the random 
effect, and ti ,ε  the error term. The random effect iν  is assumed to be independent and 
identically distributed according to ( )2,0 νσN . The vector of socio-economic characteristics 
characterizing i  in t  is denoted by ti ,x . Among the control variables we include the number 
of adults and children living in the household, household income,11 the employment status, as 
well as dummy variables on repayments for consumer credit and housing loans. The term R is 
a dummy variable taking the value one if a household belongs to the treatment group and zero 
otherwise. Hence its coefficient captures differences in the saving ratios of treated and non-
treated households. N is another dummy variable, taking the value one if the observation 
refers to a post-reform year; its coefficient captures the evolution of  saving ratios between 
two observation periods. Hence, the coefficient χ  pertaining to the interaction term mirrors 
the mobilization effect from the Riester scheme. In particular, 0>χ  would indicate that the 
Riester reform has stimulated savings among treated households. 
Our second estimation method is a first-difference estimator of the following form, 
 
( ) ( ) )()'()(2 ,,,,,,,,,, tijtiititijtijtitijtitijti NRNRss εεχβα −+⋅−⋅+−+=− +++++ xx  
                                                            
11 Deflated with an index calculated from the average net household income in each year according to the 




where ( )tijti ss ,, −+  denotes the difference in i ’s saving rates between periods jt +  and t . 
Similarly, the vector )( ,, tijti xx −+  stands for inter-temporal changes in the socioeconomic 
covariates. The time-invariant individual effect iν  cancels out. Again, 0>χ  would suggest a 
stimulation effect from the reform.  
In the third place, we provide estimates of the average treatment effect on the treated, 
ATT, by using matching methods. We construct a sample such that the distributions of several 
characteristics are similar in the groups of treated and control units, so as to cope with the 
issue of selection bias (Iacus et al., 2008). For the sample of matched units, the ATT is 
elicited through a simple ordinary least square regression of the form 
 
( ) iitijti Rss εβα ++≡−+ )(3 ,, .  
 
Table 3 summarizes the matching variables: household net income, age of the household 
head, number of adults, and number of children living in the household. The selection of the 
matching variables is guided by previous literatures on household saving suggesting that these 
variables have a prominent effect on the saving behavior of households. An extension of the 
set of matching variables would have reduced post-matching sample sizes too much: the more 
variables are considered for matching, the lower is the number of observations in the 
treatment and in the control group that have characteristics similar in all dimensions. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
We employ a monotonic imbalance bounding class of matching methods called “Coarsened 
Exact Matching” (CEM), as recently suggested by Iacus et al. (2008). Matching is done 
without replacement. To assess the quality of the matching outcome, we compare, before and 
after matching, descriptive statistics of the matching variables in both the treatment and the 
control group. In addition, we provide two measures of imbalance suggested by Iacus et al. 
(2008). The first measure, 
 













gives the sum of absolute differences over all cells of a multivariate histogram. In Eq. (4), 
kll
f ...1 denote the relative frequencies of the categorical variables jl  for the treated households, 
and 
kll
g ...1  for the control households. These frequencies are obtained in three steps. First, the 
number of categories for each (continuous) variable is chosen. Then, the discretized variables 
are cross-tabulated separately for the treated and the control group. Finally, the k -
dimensional relative frequency is computed. Perfect balance across all variables is achieved if 
( ) 0,1 =gfL , whereas ( ) 1,1 =gfL  indicates perfect separation. Let the relative frequencies of 
the matched dataset be denoted by mf  and 
mg ; one hopes to find 
( ) ( ) 0,, 111 >−=Δ mm gfLgfLL , and the difference can be interpreted as the increase in 
balance achieved as a result of matching.12  The measure defined by (4) can also be quantified 
for each variable j separately, which we then denote by )(1
jL . )(1
jL  allows an assessment of the 
variable-specific imbalance.  
Our second measure,  
 
( ) kjXXI j wmj wmj CT ,...,1,5 )( ,)( ,)(1 =−= ,  
 
is the difference in the means of variable j  for the group of treated ( Tm ) and control units 





5.1 Panel regressions 
5.1.1 Estimates from random-effects tobit models 
Random-effects tobit model regression results are displayed in Table 4. For each of our four 
approaches and intertemporal comparisons, three model specifications are estimated. The 
model specifications differ by the set of control variables that they include. For each 
intertemporal comparison, the first column contains the estimates pertaining to a regression 
specification without any further control variable. The second column reports estimates when 
                                                            
12 See Blackwell et al. (2009, p. 6). 




basic socio-demographic household characteristics are included as controls, while the third 
column exhibits the estimates of a specification with additional dummies that capture the 
employment status and the household’s financial position. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
The coefficient of the interact variable is of special interest for our purposes. Variable interact 
refers to the interaction term of the treatment dummy and the post-reform dummy. The 
reference year is always the earliest year in the dataset. In twenty-five out of twenty-seven 
regressions the estimated coefficient on the interaction term is statistically insignificant, 
suggesting that the Riester incentives produced a negligible effect on household saving. 
The treatment dummy treat is statistically insignificant in most regressions: the 
treatment groups do not show a higher propensity to save.14 The socio-economic control 
variables household size (captured by the number of adults and children) and income have 
instead a robust effect on saving rates. The saving rate increases with household income, 
whereas a larger household size decreases the saving rate. Unemployment and repayments of 
credits and housing loans have a robust and negative influence on saving rates. The other 
control variables have no robust effect. 
 
5.1.2 Estimates from first-differences 
First-differences results are shown in Table 5. They are similar to those from the random-
effects tobit models. Only in two specifications for the first approach a significant treatment 
effect in one year combination (2000-2004) can be observed. This effect disappears after one 
year. When the sample is confined to low- and middle-income households (Approach 2), a 
stimulating effect of the Riester subsidies is not visible any more. 
The influence of the control variables is as expected: an increase in household size 
lowers the savings ratio and the same is true for debt repayments. Increases in household 




14 However, in our Approaches 1 and 2, marginally significant and positive treat coefficients for the comparisons 
2000 vs. 2006 and 2000 vs. 2007 suggest higher savings in the treatment groups. Here, we only report results for 
year combinations that offer enough observations for the later matching. Unfortunately, this is not the case for 
the years 2006 and 2007 in most of the approaches. Results for these year combinations are available from the 




Table 5 about here 
 
5.2 Matching approach 
As mentioned above, our regression analysis is not immune to the problem of selection bias. 
To illustrate this problem, some comments about the degree of imbalance in the original 
unmatched data and the data after matching are in order. For each of our four approaches, 
Table 6 reports summary statistics allowing, for each matching variable, an assessment of the 
degree of imbalance before and after matching.  
 
Table 6 about here 
 
By way of an example, consider Approach 1 when the inter-temporal comparison refers to 
periods 2000 and 2004. For each of the matching variables, the columns entitled )(1
jL  and )(1
jI  
give the estimates of the variable-specific imbalance measures after and before matching. In 
the adjacent columns, imbalances between the treated and controls, the minimum, the three 
quantile means, and the maximum are reported. Thus, the value 0.074 appearing in column 
“ )(1
jL , after” for the variable “age” indicates a moderate imbalance between the treat and 
control units matched, which is substantially lower than the estimate 0.311 for the non-
matched observations that appears in column “ )(1
jL , before”. Also the second measure, “ )(1
jI ”, 
points to a substantial decrease of imbalance for the variable “age” – as shown by the value -
0.312 for the matched units as compared to -4.837 for the units before matching. Next to the 
variable-specific imbalance measures, is reported the change in the global imbalance measure, 
1LΔ , which indicates that the matching algorithm was effective in increasing the balance over 
all the matching variables. 
It is transparent that the matching procedure has been effective in reducing the global 
imbalance across all variables as well as variable specific imbalances. This applies to all four 
approaches. In particular, it applies to Approaches 1 and 2 where imbalances before matching 
were relatively large. 
We are now in a position to inspect whether our previous conclusions on the 
effectiveness of the Riester scheme hold for the units matched. The results are summarized in 
the column Average treatment effect in Table 7. The treatment effect is insignificant in seven 
out of nine cases. In two cases the treatment effect is weakly significant but it fails to carry the 
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correct sign. Hence, also for the units matched, where selection bias should not play a role, we 
cannot identify a stimulating effect of the Riester scheme on the propensity to save. 
A limitation of the matching approach is that it leads to small sample sizes. Small 
samples raise the question whether the conclusions drawn from the matching approach are 
representative for the underlying overall population. This explains why it was useful to 
combine the matching approach with a panel regression analysis, so as to assess the 
robustness of the empirical results. 
 
Table 7 about here 
 
As shown by Dehejia and Wahba (2002), ATT estimates after matching may be sensitive to 
the choice of the matching algorithm. We have checked for robustness of our results by 
applying matching methods other than CEM. In particular, we have implemented propensity 
score matching techniques implemented in the STATA package psmatch2, encompassing, 
amongst others, nearest neighbor or within caliper, radius, kernel, and Maholanobis 
matching.  The obtained results are in line with those of Table 7.15 
 
5.3 Results from SAVE 
As mentioned above, the SOEP saving variable is an imperfect measure of a household’s 
savings. Therefore, we have conducted a regression analysis using a second dataset, the 
SAVE study. While the SAVE study was explicitly designed to investigate saving behavior, it 
only allows for an analysis of the effectiveness of the so-called Riester steps, i.e. the increase 
of the subsidy rate after 2003. The results from random-effects panel regressions based on the 
SAVE data are exhibited in Table 8. Those results are in line with those obtained applying the 
same methodology to the SOEP data (Table 4). As shown by Table 8, in twenty-two out of 
twenty-seven regressions the coefficient on the interaction term is statistically insignificant. In 
the five remaining regressions, it carries the wrong sign and is not strongly significant.  
 
Table 8 about here 
 
In Approach 4, the treat dummies are always significantly positive while the interaction terms 
yield a significantly negative sign in some year combinations. This suggests that households 
with a Riester contract have a higher propensity to save, but the additional incentives 
                                                            
15 Results are available from the authors on request.  
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generated by the Riester steps did not raise or even lowered those households’ saving rate. 
The positive treat coefficient in the 2000-2006 comparison in case of the SOEP data (Table 4) 
supports this presumption. In any case, the findings indicate that comparisons of eligible 
households having a Riester contract and those which have not may suffer from severe self-
selection problems, since households with a high propensity to save are more likely to sign a 
Riester contract. This confirms the usefulness of complementing panel regressions with a 
matching approach.  
 
6 Concluding remarks 
The Riester scheme is the central pillar of governmental promotion of private retirement 
saving in Germany. In this paper, we have conducted a comprehensive treatment analysis of 
the Riester scheme so as to assess its effectiveness in raising private household savings. The 
introduction of the Riester allowances and tax deductions has been interpreted as a natural 
experiment and we have investigated how the savings of treated household have evolved as 
compared to the savings of control households. In order to check the robustness of our results, 
we have employed panel regressions and matching methods to reduce problems of 
unobserved heterogeneity and sample selection bias. Several model specifications as well as 
time periods have been examined and two datasets used, the German SOEP and the SAVE 
study. 
Despite the variety of estimation methods and datasets, the obtained results are fairly 
stable: in general, no statistically significant effect of the Riester scheme on private saving can 
be detected. Apparently, many private households that would have saved also in the absence 
of the Riester scheme simply allocated some of their savings to Riester contracts. In this way, 
those households can improve their future living standards without the pain of reducing 
current consumption. The likely counterpart of those windfall gains is an increase in public 
debt, which calls for larger primary surpluses in the future. This suggests that a major effect 
of the Riester scheme is to substitute future increases in social security contributions with 
future tax increases. 
The ineffectiveness of saving incentives may be more pronounced in Germany than in 
other countries. German households traditionally display a relatively high saving rate. 
Furthermore, all compulsorily insured persons regularly receive notification about the likely 
amount of pension benefit that they are going to receive as a retiree. Alternative long-term 
financial instruments, e.g. life insurance, are common and well known by the population. In 
15 
 
such a situation, the rationale for subsidizing certified retirement plans is rather weak. Our 
empirical results corroborate the view that there may be better uses of taxpayer money for 
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Figure 1. The Riester scheme and used observation points in the datasets 
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Table 1. Fiscal costs of the Riester scheme 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
# Riester contracts (in 
mio.) 
3.37 3.92 4.19 5.63 8.05 10.76 12.15 
Allowances (in mio. 
Euro) 
146.8 173.9 384.9 521.9 1,114.3 1,488.9 2,241.8 
Tax deductions (in mio. 
Euro) 
38.5 53.5 107.8 147.2 314.3 420.1 632.4 
Total subsidies (in mio. 
Euro) 
185.3 227.4 492.7 669.1 1,428.6 1,909.0 2,874.2 
Italic figures are own extrapolation based on the figures of the previous years. Source: Number of Riester 
contracts: Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (www.bmas.bund.de); allowances/tax deductions: 
Kriete-Dodds/Vorgrimler (2007), Kriete-Dodds (2008), and Federal Statistical Office (2009).  
 
Table 2. Alternative definitions of treatment and control group 
Approach Treatment group Control group 
1 Households eligible for Riester Households not eligible for Riester 
2 Households eligible for Riester, income below mean in the respective year 
Households not eligible for Riester, income below 
mean in the respective year 
3 Two adults, married, income below mean, two children 
Two adults, married, income below mean, one 
child 
4 Household head with a Riester contract A Household head without a Riester contract but eligible household members A 
A For the SOEP. The results are qualitatively unchanged when comparing households with and without  
 Riester contract but eligibility as implemented with the SAVE data. Own illustration. 
 
Table 3. Matching variables and their coarsened categories 
 Approach 
Matching 























age of the 
household head 
20-30, 30-35, 35-40, 40-45, 
45-50, 50-55, 55-60 
20-30, 30-35, 35-







40, 40-45, 45-50, 
50-55, 55-60 
number of adults 1, 2 1, 2 --- 1, 2 
number of 




Table 4. Random-effects panel regressions (tobit), full sample 
Approach 1  2000 vs 2004 2000 vs 2005 
Treat 0.005 0.015 0.015 0.028 0.028 0.022 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) 
After reform -0.116*** -0.123*** -0.125*** -0.105*** -0.112*** -0.115*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Interact 0.026 0.029* 0.036** 0.021 0.022 0.025 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) 
Age  -0.001*** -0.001**  -0.001*** -0.001** 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Children  -0.041*** -0.037***  -0.042*** -0.037*** 
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Adults  -0.011 0.000  -0.017** -0.007 
  (0.007) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.007) 
Income  0.056*** 0.051***  0.060*** 0.054*** 
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Unemployed   -0.121***   -0.126*** 
   (0.011)   (0.011) 
Self-employed   -0.021   -0.039*** 
   (0.013)   (0.013) 
Civil servant   0.013   0.016 
   (0.011)   (0.011) 
Credit   -0.071***   -0.075*** 
   (0.005)   (0.006) 
Housing loan   -0.021***   -0.025*** 
   (0.006)   (0.007) 
Constant 0.096*** 0.048** 0.067*** 0.076*** 0.041* 0.074*** 
  (0.016) (0.023) (0.022) (0.018) (0.024) (0.024) 
Sigma u 0.139*** 0.120*** 0.110*** 0.130*** 0.111*** 0.102*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Sigma e 0.133*** 0.133*** 0.133*** 0.139*** 0.138*** 0.137*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Rho 0.522 0.448 0.408 0.467 0.390 0.354 
Wald Chi2 568.03 1,127.53 1,420.35 411.87 981.05 1,268.94 
Log-likelihood -556.35 -272.07 -113.02 -496.95 212.75 -56.30 
Number of 
households 2,963 2,611 
Treatment 
households (%) 0.95 0.95 
Random-effects panel model (tobit). Standard errors in parentheses. Rho is the percent contribution to the total 
variance of the panel-level variance component. If it is zero, the panel estimator is not different from the pooled 
estimator. Sigma u: panel-level standard deviation; Sigma e: standard deviation of εit. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1; Source: SOEP.  
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Table 4 continued 
 
Approach 2 2000 vs 2004 2000 vs 2005 
Treat 0.028 0.018 0.025 0.053** 0.040* 0.044* 




*** -0.097*** -0.079*** -0.058** -0.059** 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) 
Interact 0.024 0.013 0.017 0.003 -0.023 -0.023 
 (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) 
Age  -0.001 -0.000  -0.001* -0.001 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Children  -0.058*** -0.054***  -0.061*** -0.057*** 
  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) 
Adults  -0.083*** -0.067***  -0.088*** -0.073*** 
  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010) 
Income  0.160*** 0.149***  0.173*** 0.161*** 
  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.009) (0.009) 
Unemployed   -0.092***   -0.089*** 
   (0.013)   (0.013) 
Selfemployed   -0.039*   -0.041* 
   (0.021)   (0.022) 
Civil servant   -0.030   -0.022 
   (0.022)   (0.022) 
Credit   -0.078***   -0.084*** 
   (0.008)   (0.008) 
Housing loan   -0.015   -0.023** 
   (0.010)   (0.010) 
Constant 0.018 -0.051* -0.030 -0.000 -0.071** -0.038 
  (0.022) (0.030) (0.029) (0.025) (0.033) (0.032) 
Sigma u 0.143*** 0.121*** 0.113*** 0.140*** 0.115*** 0.107*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Sigma e 0.141*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.146*** 0.140*** 0.139*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Rho 0.507 0.435 0.401 0.479 0.401 0.371 
Wald Chi2 214.02 622.61 761.03 159.34 621.49 750.43 
Log-likelihood -658.84 -439.84 -355.77 -578.08 -331.19 -255.41 
Number of 
households 1,746 1,498 
Treatment 
households (%) 0.94 0.94 
Random-effects panel model (tobit). Standard errors in parentheses. Rho is the percent contribution to the total 
variance of the panel-level variance component. If it is zero, the panel estimator is not different from the pooled 
estimator. Sigma u: panel-level standard deviation; Sigma e: standard deviation of εit. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 




Table 4 continued 
Approach 3  2000 vs 2004 2000 vs 2005 
Treat -0.013 -0.019 -0.017 -0.009 -0.020 -0.019 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) 
After reform -0.080*** -0.091*** -0.086*** -0.071*** -0.096*** -0.092*** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
Interact -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.000 0.002 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) 
Age  -0.00143 -0.002  -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Income  0.095*** 0.098***  0.105*** 0.098*** 
  (0.015) (0.015)  (0.016) (0.017) 
Unemployed   -0.084***   -0.077*** 
   (0.024)   (0.028) 
Selfemployed   -0.003   -0.051 
   (0.043)   (0.047) 
Civil servant   0.008   -0.021 
   (0.033)   (0.039) 
Credit   -0.052***   -0.052*** 
   (0.012)   (0.013) 
Housing loan   -0.038***   -0.031** 
   (0.013)   (0.014) 
Constant 0.085*** -0.073 -0.034 0.082*** -0.143** -0.082 
  (0.013) (0.057) (0.056) (0.015) (0.066) (0.066) 
Sigma u 0.112*** 0.105*** 0.096*** 0.113*** 0.108*** 0.105*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Sigma e 0.109*** 0.109*** 0.110*** 0.101*** 0.099*** 0.097*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Rho 0.511 0.479 0.435 0.555 0.543 0.536 
Wald Chi2 85.42 126.35 155.44 60.01 101.49 126.86 
Log-likelihood 7.33 29.21 47.28 22.63 44.77 58.10 
Number of 
households 396 299 
Treatment 
households (%) 0.59 0.62 
Random-effects panel model (tobit). Standard errors in parentheses. Rho is the percent contribution to the total 
variance of the panel-level variance component. If it is zero, the panel estimator is not different from the pooled 
estimator. Sigma u: panel-level standard deviation; Sigma e: standard deviation of εit. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1; Source: SOEP.  
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Table 4 continued 
 Approach 4 2000 vs 2004 2000 vs 2006 2000 vs 2007 
Treat 0.0003 0.013 0.019 0.015 0.021 0.028** 0.007 0.015 0.019 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
After reform -0.084*** -0.093*** -0.090*** -0.087*** -0.089*** -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.094*** -0.099*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Interact -0.011 -0.010 -0.009 -0.007 -0.003 -0.013 0.005 0.003 -0.001 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) 
Age  0.000 0.000  -0.001*** -0.001**  -0.001 -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Children  -0.046*** -0.044***  -0.053*** -0.048***  -0.045*** -0.043*** 
  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) 
Adults  -0.084*** -0.071***  -0.098*** -0.080***  -0.091*** -0.072*** 
  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.011) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011) 
Income  0.129*** 0.126***  0.150*** 0.138***  0.138*** 0.127*** 
  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.009)  (0.009) (0.009) 
Unemployed   -0.075***   -0.109***   -0.094*** 
   (0.013)   (0.016)   (0.016) 
Selfemployed   -0.072***   -0.052**   -0.048** 
   (0.022)   (0.023)   (0.023) 
Civil servant   -0.040**   -0.015   -0.005 
   (0.020)   (0.020)   (0.020) 
Credit   -0.082***   -0.074***   -0.086*** 
   (0.007)   (0.008)   (0.009) 
Housing loan   -0.026***   -0.029***   -0.020** 
   (0.009)   (0.010)   (0.010) 
Constant 0.073*** 0.000 0.022 0.076*** 0.043* 0.057** 0.080*** 0.024 0.043* 
  (0.005) (0.021) (0.020) (0.006) (0.024) (0.023) (0.007) (0.025) (0.024) 
Sigma u 0.135*** 0.117*** 0.107*** 0.125*** 0.105*** 0.097*** 0.121*** 0.105*** 0.094*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Sigma e 0.131*** 0.129*** 0.128*** 0.146*** 0.140*** 0.139*** 0.143*** 0.138*** 0.138*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Rho 0.518 0.450 0.410 0.422 0.362 0.327 0.417 0.366 0.316 
Wald Chi2 278.10 634.64 811.00 191.39 579.98 690.19 172.01 460.90 583.05 
Log-likelihood -401.54 -214.77 119.51 -400.10 -201.08 -132.85 -310.25 -163.23 -95.50 
Number of 
households 1,691 1,320 1,168 
Treatment 
households (%) 0.13 0.18 0.23 
Random-effects panel model (tobit). Standard errors in parentheses. Rho is the percent contribution to the total 
variance of the panel-level variance component. If it is zero, the panel estimator is not different from the pooled 
estimator. Sigma u: panel-level standard deviation; Sigma e: standard deviation of εit. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 




Table 5. First-differences regressions (OLS), full sample (SOEP) 
Approach 1  2000 vs 2004 2000 vs 2005 
Treatment 0.017 0.020* 0.023** 0.008 0.012 0.013 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) 
Children  -0.029*** -0.026***  -0.030*** -0.027*** 
  (0.005) (0.005)  (0.005) (0.005) 
Adults  0.010 0.013  0.003 0.007 
  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008) 
Income  0.010*** 0.011***  0.015*** 0.015*** 
  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Unemployed   -0.008   -0.018** 
   (0.008)   (0.009) 
Credit   -0.025***   -0.033*** 
   (0.005)   (0.005) 
Housing loan   -0.038***   -0.039*** 
   (0.007)   (0.007) 
Constant -0.089*** -0.090*** -0.091*** -0.079*** -0.082*** -0.082*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
R-squared 0.001 0.016 0.033 0.000 0.022 0.047 
Number of 
households 2,963 2,611 
Treatment 
households (%) 0.95 0.95 




Approach 2  2000 vs 2004 2000 vs 2005 
Treatment 0.007 0.005 0.005 -0.006 -0.011 -0.012 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Children  -0.021*** -0.021***  -0.027*** -0.027*** 
  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) 
Adults  -0.017 -0.016  -0.024** -0.023** 
  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010) 
Income  0.043*** 0.047***  0.0551*** 0.058*** 
  (0.007) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008) 
Unemployed   0.0014   -0.0047 
   (0.009)   (0.0095) 
Credit   -0.027***   -0.033*** 
   (0.006)   (0.007) 
Housing loan   -0.010   -0.032*** 
   (0.010)   (0.010) 
Constant -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.062*** -0.052*** -0.047*** -0.047*** 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
R-squared 0.000 0.024 0.035 0.000 0.045 0.067 
Number of 
households 1,746 1,498 
Treatment 
households (%) 0.94 0.94 







Table 5 continued.  
Approach 3  2000 vs 2004 2000 vs 2005 
Treatment -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) 
Income  0.0220 0.023  0.035** 0.036** 
  (0.014) (0.015)  (0.015) (0.015) 
Unemployed   -0.004   -0.009 
   (0.019)   (0.020) 
Credit   0.0004   -0.012 
   (0.012)   (0.011) 
Housing loan   -0.015   -0.042*** 
   (0.015)   (0.014) 
Constant -0.061
*** -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.052*** -0.059*** -0.055*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
R-squared 0.000 0.006 0.009 0.000 0.019 0.049 
Number of 
households 396 299 
Treatment 
households (%) 0.59 0.62 




Approach 4  2000 vs 2004 2000 vs 2006 2000 vs 2007 
Treatment -0.0063 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.005 -0.0013 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Children  -0.017*** -0.016**  -0.026*** -0.022***  -0.028*** -0.027*** 
  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006) 
Adults  -0.024** -0.025**  -0.043*** -0.044***  -0.035*** -0.029*** 
  (0.011) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.011) 
Income  0.036*** 0.041***  0.064*** 0.071***  0.055*** 0.057*** 
  (0.007) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.009) (0.009) 
Unemployed   0.0025   0.002   -0.008 
   (0.010)   (0.011)   (0.012) 
Credit   -0.028***   -0.027***   -0.024*** 
   (0.006)   (0.008)   (0.008) 
Housing loan   -0.023**   -0.051***   -0.0330*** 
   (0.010)   (0.010)   (0.010) 
Constant -0.064*** -0.065*** -0.065*** -0.067*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.068*** -0.070*** -0.070*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
R-squared 0.000 0.018 0.033 0.000 0.052 0.077 0.000 0.044 0.061 
Number of 




0.13 0.18 0.23 










jI  Between-group differences by quantiles  
Variables 
Year 
after before After Before 0 25 50 75 100 
Age 2000 0.074 0.311 -0.312 -4.837 0.000 0.000 -1.000 0.000 0.000 
Income 2000 0.139 0.208 -0.002 -0.003 -0.237 0.052 -0.021 0.052 0.409 
 2004 0.109 0.224 0.013 0.082 0.123 0.053 0.097 -0.094 0.090 
2000 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Number of 
adults 2004 0.000 0.078 0.000 0.078 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2000 0.000 0.201 0.000 0.334 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Approach 1 





of children 2004 0.000 0.267 0.000 0.455 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Age 2000 0.083 0.307 -0.330 -4.980 0.000 1.000 0.000 -1.000 0.000 
Income 2000 0.237 0.221 0.022 0.167 -0.237 0.068 0.000 0.044 -0.036 
 2005 0.171 0.284 0.008 0.320 0.121 0.071 0.029 -0.096 -0.333 
2000 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Number of 
adults 2005 0.000 0.110 0.000 0.110 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2000 0.000 0.197 0.000 0.298 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Approach 1 





children 2005 0.000 0.297 0.000 0.509 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Age 2000 0.108 0.369 -0.542 -4.701 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Income 2000 0.097 0.209 0.019 0.223 -0.237 0.036 0.063 0.047 0.010 
 2004 0.129 0.295 0.032 0.347 0.123 0.020 0.094 0.097 0.053 
2000 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Number of 
adults 2004 0.000 0.089 0.000 0.089 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2000 0.000 0.231 0.000 0.436 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Approach 2 





children 2004 0.000 0.314 0.000 0.565 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Age 2000 0.106 0.366 -0.589 -5.783 0.000 -1.000 -1.000 -1.000 0.000 
Income 2000 0.065 0.250 -0.002 0.216 -0.237 -0.022 0.027 0.000 -0.010 
 2005 0.122 0.287 -0.018 0.433 0.121 -0.048 -0.106 -0.106 0.033 
2000 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.083 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Number of 
adults 2005 0.000 0.088 0.000 0.088 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2000 0.000 0.211 0.000 0.356 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Approach 2 





children 2005 0.000 0.340 0.000 0.606 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Age 2000 0.095 0.154 0.059 -0.026 2.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Income 2000 0.116 0.092 0.003 0.053 -0.142 -0.027 -0.001 0.063 -0.041 
Approach 3 




 2004 0.164 0.144 0.032 0.093 0.086 0.046 -0.011 -0.016 -0.001 
Age 2000 0.086 0.140 -0.079 -0.773 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -3.000 
Income 2000 0.135 0.136 0.007 0.082 -0.121 0.015 0.021 0.076 -0.027 
Approach 3 




 2005 0.129 0.144 0.001 0.080 -0.324 -0.066 0.056 -0.045 -0.012 
Age 2000 0.065 0.128 0.007 -1.978 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Income 2000 0.109 0.121 -0.004 0.082 0.009 0.027 0.008 -0.014 -0.106 
 2004 0.090 0.148 0.000 0.117 0.070 -0.041 0.000 -0.003 -0.014 
2000 0.000 0.088 0.000 0.088 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Number of 
adults 2004 0.000 0.084 0.000 0.084 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2000 0.000 0.182 0.000 0.343 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Approach 4 





children 2004 0.000 0.193 0.000 0.416 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Age 2000 0.044 0.157 -0.061 -3.052 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 -2.000 
Income 2000 0.105 0.126 0.003 0.068 0.018 0.000 0.033 -0.084 0.010 
 2006 0.109 0.135 0.008 0.134 0.009 0.006 0.049 0.003 0.000 
2000 0.000 0.069 0.000 0.069 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Number of 
adults 2006 0.000 0.096 0.000 0.096 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2000 0.000 0.139 0.000 0.217 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Approach 4 





children 2006 0.000 0.210 0.000 0.449 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Age 2000 0.128 0.124 0.138 -2.526 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Income 2000 0.078 0.092 -0.001 0.049 0.000 0.000 -0.010 0.035 0.052 
 2007 0.107 0.120 0.007 0.137 0.002 -0.018 -0.009 -0.035 -0.011 
2000 0.000 0.073 0.000 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Number of 
adults 2007 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
2000 0.000 0.119 0.000 0.215 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Approach 4 





children 2007 0.000 0.212 0.000 0.446 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Own calculations. Source: SOEP.  
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Table 7. Treatment effects for matched units 






treat 830 1 2000 vs. 2004 control 127 0.012 0.013 
treat 552  2000 vs. 2005 control 101 0.012 0.015 
treat 339 2 2000 vs. 2004 control 81 -0.005 0.017 
treat 205  2000 vs. 2005 control 66 0.010 0.016 
treat 228 3 2000 vs. 2004 control 158 0.000 0.012 
treat 176  2000 vs. 2005 control 107 -0.008 0.013 
treat 150 4 2000 vs. 2004 control 476 -0.022
* 0.013 
treat 149  2000 vs. 2006 control 315 0.008 0.013 
treat 142  2000 vs. 2007 control 281 -0.025
* 0.014 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 




Table 8. Random-effects panel regressions (tobit), full sample (SAVE) 
 
Approach 1  2003 vs 2005 2003 vs 2006 2003 vs 2007 
Treat 0.040 0.031 0.040 0.045 0.036 0.043 0.040 0.036 0.057 
 (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) 
After reform -0.010 -0.012 -0.020 -0.011 -0.013 -0.019 -0.015 -0.008 -0.015 
 (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) (0.048) (0.050) (0.051) 
Interact -0.040 -0.041 -0.035 -0.012 -0.009 -0.005 -0.006 -0.013 -0.014 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.050) (0.048) (0.048) (0.050) (0.052) (0.053) 
Age  0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Children  -0.008 -0.007  -0.013 -0.011  -0.007 -0.005 
  (0.007) (0.007)  (0.008) (0.008)  (0.008) (0.008) 
Adults  0.053*** 0.053***  0.040* 0.042*  0.039* 0.032 
  (0.020) (0.020)  (0.023) (0.024)  (0.022) (0.022) 
Income  0.001 0.000  0.018*** 0.016***  0.017*** 0.017*** 
  (0.002) (0.002)  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.005) 
Unemployed   -0.058***   -0.051**   -0.072*** 
   (0.021)   (0.024)   (0.022) 
Self-employed   0.035   0.006   0.028 
   (0.034)   (0.040)   (0.042) 
Civil servant   0.100***   0.045   0.013 
   (0.030)   (0.031)   (0.029) 
CreditA   -0.020   -0.025   -0.017 
   (0.015)   (0.017)   (0.016) 
Constant -0.002 -0.130** -0.126** -0.015 -0.129* -0.130** -0.010 -0.140** -0.134** 
  (0.027) (0.059) (0.056) (0.038) (0.066) (0.065) (0.039) (0.066) (0.064) 
Sigma u 0.093*** 0.090*** 0.077*** 0.097*** 0.084*** 0.081*** 0.080*** 0.062*** 0.051*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.017) 
Sigma e 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.130*** 0.124*** 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.115*** 0.121*** 0.123*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Rho 0.349 0.333 0.262 0.376 0.303 0.285 0.324 0.206 0.147 
Wald Chi2 16.26 25.97 48.46 4.27 22.58 31.98 3.68 22.09 35.30 
Log-likelihood -34.99 -29.90 -18.39 -16.00 -6.89 -2.05 10.92 19.80 26.31 
Number of 
households 298 223 191 
Treatment 
households (%) 0.86 0.90 0.92 
A Captures different kinds of loan repayments. Random-effects panel model (tobit). Random-effects panel model 
(tobit). Rho is the percent contribution to the total variance of the panel-level variance component. If it is zero, 
the panel estimator is not different from the pooled estimator. Sigma u: panel-level standard deviation; Sigma e: 
standard deviation of εit.  Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 








Table 8 continued. 
 
Approach 2 2003 vs 2005 2003 vs 2006 2003 vs 2007 
Treat 0.027 0.043 0.044 0.143** 0.129** 0.115* 0.141* 0.095 0.092 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.065) (0.065) (0.067) (0.075) (0.072) (0.074) 
After reform -0.051 -0.038 -0.041 0.042 0.037 0.029 0.010 0.009 0.024 
 (0.042) (0.044) (0.044) (0.077) (0.078) (0.078) (0.096) (0.096) (0.097) 
Interact 0.002 -0.018 -0.012 -0.104 -0.096 -0.086 -0.040 -0.048 -0.066 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.081) (0.081) (0.082) (0.099) (0.100) (0.100) 
Age  0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001  0.002 0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) 
Children  -0.024** -0.022**  -0.017 -0.017  -0.026* -0.025* 
  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.015) (0.017)  (0.014) (0.014) 
Adults  -0.045* -0.045*  -0.063* -0.050  -0.009 -0.005 
  (0.026) (0.027)  (0.035) (0.037)  (0.032) (0.033) 
Income  0.099*** 0.100***  0.098*** 0.103***  0.098*** 0.098*** 
  (0.021) (0.022)  (0.025) (0.029)  (0.025) (0.028) 
Unemployed   -0.007   0.016   -0.021 
   (0.025)   (0.037)   (0.032) 
Self-employed   0.021   -0.021   -0.108 
   (0.050)   (0.062)   (0.091) 
Civil servant   0.015   0.067   0.017 
   (0.044)   (0.061)   (0.055) 
CreditA   -0.038*   -0.015   -0.020 
   (0.020)   (0.027)   (0.027) 
Constant -0.031 -0.139** -0.134* -0.147** -0.225** -0.243** -0.149** -0.308*** -0.305*** 
 (0.034) (0.071) (0.070) (0.063) (0.098) (0.099) (0.074) (0.104) (0.105) 
Sigma u 0.090*** 0.069*** 0.066*** 0.088*** 0.074*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.000) (0.000) 
Sigma e 0.122*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 0.148*** 0.156*** 0.155*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013) (0.0124) 
Rho 0.355 0.234 0.218   0.265   0.206 0.198 0.197 0.000 0.000 
Wald Chi2 9.71 35.07 38.96 10.69 25.62 26.93   6.09 25.50 28.28 
Log-likelihood -45.00 -31.33 -29.33 -43.59 -34.82 -34.01 -35.72 141.97 144.83 
Number of 
households 163 125 108 
Treatment 
households (%) 0.83 0.89 0.91 
A Captures different kinds of loan repayments. Random-effects panel model (tobit). Random-effects panel model 
(tobit). Rho is the percent contribution to the total variance of the panel-level variance component. If it is zero, 
the panel estimator is not different from the pooled estimator. Sigma u: panel-level standard deviation; Sigma e: 
standard deviation of εit.  Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 









Table 8 continued. 
 
Approach 4  2003 vs 2005 2003 vs 2006 2003 vs 2007 
Treat 0.128*** 0.116** 0.145*** 0.131** 0.129*** 0.150*** 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.158*** 
 (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.051) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.046) (0.046) 
After reform -0.036* -0.043** -0.036* -0.072*** -0.072*** -0.070*** -0.003 -0.003 -0.008 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
Interact -0.114* -0.120** -0.140** -0.094 -0.103* -0.106* -0.088 -0.092 -0.088 
 (0.060) (0.061) (0.060) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059) (0.060) (0.059) 
Age  -0.000 0.000  0.001 0.001  -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.001) 
Children  -0.026** -0.021  -0.022 -0.020  -0.023 -0.020 
  (0.013) (0.013)  (0.016) (0.016)  (0.015) (0.015) 
Adults  -0.027 -0.017  -0.001 0.015  -0.017 -0.015 
  (0.032) (0.033)  (0.037) (0.038)  (0.031) (0.031) 
Income  0.075*** 0.074***  0.071*** 0.073***  0.059*** 0.060*** 
  (0.022) (0.024)  (0.023) (0.025)  (0.020) (0.022) 
Unemployed   -0.005   0.009   -0.018 
   (0.028)   (0.033)   (0.029) 
Self-employed   0.086   -0.006   -0.718 
   (0.053)   (0.064)   (81.42) 
Civil servant   0.068   0.082   0.035 
   (0.047)   (0.059)   (0.048) 
CreditA   -0.058***   -0.054**   -0.026 
   (0.022)   (0.025)   (0.025) 
Constant -0.007 -0.056 -0.071 0.011 -0.129 -0.156* -0.009 -0.043 -0.040 
  (0.016) (0.076) (0.076) (0.018) (0.083) (0.083) (0.018) (0.072) (0.073) 
Sigma u 0.085*** 0.073*** 0.068*** 0.105*** 0.092*** 0.088*** 0.067*** 0.051** 0.053*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020) 
Sigma e 0.113*** 0.115*** 0.113*** 0.106*** 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.112*** 0.114*** 0.110*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Rho 0.360 0.286 0.268 0.496 0.425 0.404 0.262 0.166 0.190 
Wald Chi2 14.41 28.05 37.87 26.47 36.64 41.84 11.30 24.16 26.45 
Log-likelihood -19.65 -11.96 -6.55 -9.167 -2.74 0.16 -1.68 4.59 8.21 
Number of 
households 120 100 84 
Treatment 
households (%) 0.17 0.20 0.21 
A Captures different kinds of loan repayments. Random-effects panel model (tobit). Random-effects panel model 
(tobit). Rho is the percent contribution to the total variance of the panel-level variance component. If it is zero, 
the panel estimator is not different from the pooled estimator. Sigma u: panel-level standard deviation; Sigma e: 
standard deviation of εit.  Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: SAVE.  
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